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Abstract
We show that the problem of evaluating infinite
sequences (or streams) of utilities by a unique
utility (or social welfare function) can be stated
in terms of fuzzy subsets of the set of infinite uti-
lity sequences. For each stream, its evaluation
can be viewed as its degree of membership to the
subset of ‘ethically acceptable’ streams within
the set of possible sequences. Since the property
‘being ethically acceptable’ is not well defined
and cannot be exactly measured, the fuzzy ap-
proach seems especially adequate.
Keywords: Fuzzy subset, Social welfare func-
tion, Ethical.
1 INTRODUCTION
The resolution of real-world intergenerational conflicts
such as global warming has given place to many analyses
of intergenerational social preferences over infinite streams
of utilities or well-being. A very authoritative review of
these contributions is covered by Asheim [2]. They raise
the question: How should the streams of utilities be ranked
from a social perspective, when the interests of all genera-
tions must be respected?
A practical way to perform this comparison consists of
evaluating the relevant infinite streams of utilities by a
unique utility, which is then called a social welfare func-
tion. In the present contribution we show that this problem
can be stated in terms of fuzzy subsets of the relevant set
of infinite utility streams. The idea is as follows: when
these evaluations are valued in [0,1] we can view them as
membership functions that capture the degree of agreement
with the imprecise statement ‘the infinite stream is ethi-
cally acceptable’. This seems pretty appropriate because
the property ‘being ethically acceptable’ is not well defined
and cannot be exactly measured. In technical terms, any
social welfare function W on a set of infinite streams X
whose values lie in [0,1] (and this is a matter of normaliza-
tion) is identified with a fuzzy subset of X. And for each x,
W(x) is its degree of membership to the subset of ‘ethically
acceptable’ streams in X.
Since social welfare functions are used to determine opti-
mal policies in infinite horizon models, they are expected to
verify an adequate combination of principles of two kinds:
egalitarian treatment of the generations and sensitivity to
the interests of each generation. Such requirement can be
stated in terms of our alternative viewpoint, and then eth-
ical fuzzy subsets appear naturally, with properties inher-
ited from the literature on intergenerational equity. In fact
the design of acceptable social welfare functions is contro-
versial since many impossibility results show that an infi-
nite number of generations cannot be treated equally while
still being sensitive to the interests of each generation. We
transfer that debate to the selection of ethical fuzzy subsets.
This work is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present
the standard approch to the design of social welfare func-
tions and some of its desirable properties in the context of
intergenerational aggregation of the utilities. In Section
3 we state the corresponding problem in terms of ethical
fuzzy sets, with prominent examples and the resolution of
some particular statements. Other variations that lead to
related approaches to the problem of constructing ethical
fuzzy subsets are discussed too. We conclude in Section 4.
2 SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS:
EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY
PROPERTIES
Let X ⊆ RN represent a domain of infinite-horizon utility
sequences (henceforth, streams). We adopt the standard no-
tation for infinite streams: x = (x1, ...,xn, .......) ∈ X. Each
xi can represent for example, either the allocation of utility
to an agent from an infinite society or the welfare endow-
ment of a generation or its consumption. For simplicity we
use the terminology from intergeneral justice and say that
each component is a generation. We write x > y if xi > yi
for each i = 1,2, ...; x y if xi > yi for each i = 1,2, ...;
and x > y if x> y and x 6= y.
Social welfare relations are binary relations on X. They are
interpreted as normative welfare criteria on the domain X.
A social welfare function (SWF) is a function W : X−→R,
also regarded as a representable social welfare relation.
The analysis of intergenerational aggregation by means of
SWFs is usually called the Basu-Mitra approach. More
generally, one can use binary relations in the comparison
of utility streams.
Let W be a SWF. We first proceed to recall some efficiency
properties (axioms) that we use along the paper. Then we
mention the equity property under inspection, as well as
other possible approaches.
2.1 EFFICIENCY PROPERTIES
The most standard version of the Pareto axiom is the very
demanding principle that improving the allocation of at
least one generation should increase the social evaluation:
Axiom SP (Strong Pareto). If x,y∈X, x> y then W(x)>
W(y) .
The next axioms are all implied by Strong Pareto.
Axiom MON (Monotonicity). If x,y ∈ X, x > y then
W(x)>W(y) .
MON is an undisputable property of efficiency. The next
two properties are succesively weaker than SP:
Axiom IP (Infinite Pareto). If x,y ∈ X and xi > yi for an
infinite number of indices i, then W(x)> W(y).
Axiom WP (Weak Pareto). If x,y∈X, x y then W(x)>
W(y).
An independent weaker version of Strong Pareto is:
Axiom WD (Weak Dominance). If x,y ∈ X, there is j ∈ N
with x j > y j, and xi = yi for all i 6= j, then W(x)> W(y).
2.2 EQUITY PROPERTIES
The Anonymity axiom (Axiom AN) demands that any fi-
nite permutation of a utility stream produces a socially
indifferent utility stream. This is a procedural property
of equal treatment of all generations. Such impartiality
avoids biases towards particular generations and in partic-
ular, avoids dictatorships and impatiant behaviors.
Besides procedural equity, in order to implement various
egalitarian principles the literature on intergenerational jus-
tice has provided a number of useful consequentialist eq-
uity properties. This term means that contrarily to the case
of procedural equity requirements, some streams are de-
clared as socially better than other ones on the basis of eth-
ical principles. We return to this discussion in Subsection
3.4 below.
2.3 THE CODOMAIN OF SWFs
Observe that because there exist strictly increasing map-
pings ρ : R −→ [0,1], every social welfare function W :
X−→ R can be transformed into a mapping W′ = ρ ◦W :
X −→ [0,1] in such way that W(x) >W(y) and W′(x) >
W′(y) are equivalent, for all x,y ∈ X.
The composition with ρ does not affect the fulfilment of
the axioms above: W is SP, resp., MON, IP, WP, WD, AN,
if and only if so is W′ = ρ ◦W.
Therefore for the purpose of investigating the existence of
SWFs with the axioms we have mentioned, we do not lose
generality if the codomain is assumed to be [0,1].
3 SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS AND
FUZZY SETS
SWFs are used to compare infinite streams of utilities, e.g.
by a social planner that has to decide among distributions
of well-being. Therefore SWFs are regarded as evaluations
that must meet adequate properties of efficiency and equity
in order to fulfil that role. Efficiency must be requested in
some form, since deciding on allocations should be made
consistently with certain sensitivity to the interest of the
individuals or generations. Equity among generations is
expected too, since this decision should be made with re-
spect to commonly agreed egalitarian principles as well. In
particular, the term ethical has been applied by prominent
contributors to this literature to mean that both SP and AN
are met (cf., Svensson [13]). Although we use it in this
technical sense too, we also refer to the common meaning
of the term ‘ethical’ in this context: a ‘fair’ combination of
efficiency and equity properties.
From another perspective, when these evaluations or SWFs
take values in [0,1] they can be regarded as membership
functions that capture the degree of agreement with the
statement ‘the infinite stream is ethically acceptable’. Now
the evaluation has an intrinsic value rather than being a
mere way to compare among streams (in order to choose a
maximally graded distribution of the welfare indicators, for
example). In short, we can view any social welfare func-
tion W on X (whose values lie in [0,1]) as a fuzzy subset
of X and for each x, W(x) is the degree of membership to
the subset of ‘ethically acceptable’ streams in X. To better
fit these interpretations, in the usual case where X⊆ [0,1]N
and both 1= (1,1, ...,1, ...)∈X and 0= (0,0, ...,0, ...)∈X
hold true, it seems convenient to restrict our analysis to
SWFs that verify W(1) = 1 and W(0) = 0, which due to
MON is simply a matter of normalization.
Therefore we can view one of the topics of Social Choice
as a matter of ellucidating the existence of fuzzy subsets of
a fixed X ⊆ RN (very often, X = [0,1]N) that verify cer-
tain lists of properties. As argued above, we request that
the degree of membership of the stream 1 = (1,1, ...,1, ...),
resp. 0 = (0,0, ...,0, ...), must be 1, resp. 0. This means
that whatever the interpretation of the term ‘ethically ac-
ceptable distribution’ of the infinite utilities, attaching the
maximum value to all generations is absolutely acceptable,
and attaching the null value to all generations is absolutely
insupportable. Needless to say, one can reinterpret such
fuzzy subsets as SWFs with the corresponding list of prop-
erties.
To illustrate this alternative position, we proceed to define
some pertinent concepts of ethical fuzzy subsets (in the
broad sense of the term) and then we give some results that
concern their possible existence. Finally in this Section,
we make a short digression on other related possibilities
that are left unexplored in this first contribution.
3.1 PROMINENT EXAMPLES
A very direct definition of a fuzzy subset that is inspired in
a well-known SWF is given in our first example:
Example 3.1. The minimax or Rawlsian fuzzy subset of
X = [0,1]N is defined by the membership function µR :
X−→ [0,1] such that
µR(x) = inf
i
xi, ∀x ∈ X (1)
The most popular objective function used to determine op-
timal policies in infinite horizon models is the discounted
sum of utilities, which depends on a discount factor δ ∈
(0,1). When δ > 12 the standard expression for such SWF
produces evaluations of streams that are larger than 1 thus
we need to adapt it in order to define our next prominent
example of a fuzzy subset in this analysis:
Example 3.2. Given δ ∈ (0,1), the δ -discounted fuzzy
subset of X = [0,1]N is µδ : X−→ [0,1] such that




δ i−1xi, ∀x ∈ X (2)
As requested by our definition, µR(1) = µδ (1) = 1 and
µR(0) = µδ (0) = 0.
In the analysis of infinite horizon models, a recent proposal
that has attracted much attention is the Rank-discounted
utilitarian SWF (cf., Zuber and Asheim [14, Definition 1],
where an Extended rank-discounted utilitarian SWF is de-
fined too). This suggests the next example that supposes a
variation of Example 3.2 above:
Example 3.3. Let X¯ be the set of allocations of [0,1]N
whose elements can be permuted to obtain non-decreasing
streams. Given δ ∈ (0,1), the δ -rank-discounted fuzzy
subset of X¯ is ρδ : X¯−→ [0,1] such that




δ i−1xbic, ∀x ∈ X¯ (3)
where (xb1c,xb2c, ....) is the non-decreasing infinite stream
which is a permutation of x.
3.2 ETHICAL FUZZY SETS: VARIATIONS OF A
COMPREHENSIVE TERM
Depending on the combination of properties that we de-
mand to our fuzzy subsets of X, various concepts of ethical
(in the comprehensive sense) fuzzy subsets come up.
Definition 3.1. A fuzzy subset of a domain of infinite util-
ity streams X⊆ [0,1]N such that the degree of membership
of 1 ∈ X is 1, resp. of 0 ∈ X is 0, is called
1. Ethical if a) The degree of membership of any x ∈ X
does not change under finite permutations of its coor-
dinates; and b) when x,y∈X, x allocates more than y
to some generation, and x does not allocate less than y
to any generation, then x has a higher degree of mem-
bership than y.
2. Pre-ethical if a) above; and b) when x,y ∈ X, x allo-
cates more than y to an infinite number of generations,
and x does not allocate less than y to any generation,
then x has a higher degree of membership than y.
3. Weakly ethical if a) above; and b) when x,y ∈ X, x
allocates more than y to all generations, then x has a
higher degree of membership than y.
4. Quasi-ethical if a) above; and b) when x,y ∈ X, x
allocates more than y to a generation i, and x and y
allocate the same amount to any generation other than
i, then x has a higher degree of membership than y.
5. Basically ethical if a) above; and b) when x,y ∈ X,
and x does not allocate less than y to any generation,
then y does not have a higher degree of membership
than x.
Requirement a) is an anonymity prerequisite common to
every property in the list. It implements the idea that all
generations must be treated equally: when the allocations
to any two generations are swapped, the degree of mem-
bership to the subset of ‘ethically acceptable’ streams does
not vary. Fuzzy subsets that verify a) are called anony-
mous. The respective conditions b) implement efficiency
concepts in the sense that improving the allocations to cer-
tain generations, the other generations not being worse-off,
should increase the degree of membership to the subset of
‘ethically acceptable’ streams.
A handicap for accepting the discounted sum of utilities in
the intergenerational analysis is that it discriminates future
generations. In our approach, this translates into the fact
that µδ does not meet requirement a), i.e., µδ is not anony-
mous. To overcome that drawback, one can refer to the
corresponding rank-discounted sum ρδ : it coincides with
µδ on non-decreasing streams, but it agrees with require-
ment a). We return to this point in subsection 3.3 below.
Remark 3.1. Any ethical fuzzy subset of X is pre-ethical,
quasi-ethical, and basically ethical. Pre-ethical fuzzy sub-
sets of X are weakly ethical. Furthermore, the concepts in
Definition 3.1 are hereditary by (crisp) subsets of X.
On the ground of our defense of the Monotonicity property
of SWFs, it may appear that only basically ethical fuzzy
subsets of our domain of infinite utility streams are worth
considered when a) is imposed. However under such as-
sumption some of the concepts above collapse into a single
one, as the following simple lemma justifies:
Lemma 3.1. If a fuzzy subset of [0,1]N is quasi-ethical
and basically ethical then it is ethical.
3.3 RESULTS
The following questions arise: Do there exist ethical, resp.,
pre-ethical, weakly ethical, quasi-ethical, basically ethical,
fuzzy subsets of X? It seems intuitively natural that the
answer to these questions can vary with the structure of X.
We proceed to examine all these questions separately.
3.3.1 Are there ethical fuzzy subsets?
The requirements on the set of infinite streams determines
the answer to this question. Suppose first the case where
every generation or individual has a common set of fea-
sible allocations, i.e., X ⊇ YN for some Y ⊆ [0,1]. Then
Theorem 3.1 below states that the answer for this particu-
lar question is negative even if X = {0,1}N. Such case is
the simplest possible instance for analysis: it only distin-
guishes a ‘good’ state 1 and a ‘bad’ state 0 for each gen-
eration or agent, thus for any practical purpose we have
impossibility of ethical fuzzy subsets (provided that there
is a common set of feasible allocations across generations).
This statement derives from a celebrated result by Basu and
Mitra [6, Theorem 1], which establishes that there are no
SP, AN social welfare functions on {0,1}N.
Theorem 3.1 (Basu and Mitra [6]). There do not exist e-
thical fuzzy subsets of X = {0,1}N.
However we obtain a different conclusion when we refer
our analysis to X¯ as defined in Example 3.3:
Theorem 3.2 (Zuber and Asheim [14], Prop. 5). Example
3.3 defines an ethical fuzzy subset of X¯.
3.3.2 Are there pre-ethical fuzzy subsets?
Building on [6], Crespo, Núñez, and Rincón-Zapatero [8,
Theorem 3.3] prove that there are not IP, AN social welfare
functions on {0,1}N. From this we deduce:
Theorem 3.3 (Crespo, Núñez, Rincón-Zapatero [8]).
There do not exist pre-ethical fuzzy subsets of X= {0,1}N.
Remark 3.2. Theorem 3.1 is a trivial Corollary to Theo-
rem 3.3, because ethical fuzzy subsets of X = {0,1}N are
pre-ethical. Another reason for this redundance is that [8,
Theorem 3.3] generalizes the aforementioned [6, Theorem
1] by proving that the incompatibility between SP and AN
remains when the weaker IP replaces SP. However we be-
lieve that it is just fair to state Theorem 3.1 on its own right
due to the key importance of [6] in the recent development
of the problem of aggregating infinite utility streams.
However in view of Remark 3.1 and Theorem 3.2, Example
3.3 defines a pre-ethical fuzzy subset of X¯.
3.3.3 Are there weakly ethical fuzzy subsets?
This is a case where the choice of the domain of infinite
utility streams provides a rich discussion. The motivation
for the analysis of this case is Basu and Mitra [7]. Accord-
ingly, we can state:
Theorem 3.4 (Basu and Mitra [7]). Let X = YN be a do-
main of infinite utility streams.
1. If Y = N then there exist weakly ethical fuzzy subsets
of X.
2. If Y = [0,1] then there do not exist weakly ethical
fuzzy subsets of X.
As in the previous impossibility results, the cardinality
of the set of feasible utilities (namely, Y in Theorem 3.4
above) is key in the argument. In those impossibility results
one simply ‘runs out of numbers’ when the constraints are
imposed. This partially explains the different conclusion
when Y changes from the countable (and not order-dense)
N to [0,1].
We emphasize that the appeal to discrete sets of feasible
utilities like X=YN with Y =N is supported by the recog-
nition that human perception is not endlessly fine. It is
a natural restriction e.g., when the utilities have a well-
defined smallest unit (as happens when the endowments of
the generations are monetary amounts).
Furthermore, Example 3.3 defines a weakly ethical fuzzy
subset of X¯ as argued above.
3.3.4 Are there quasi-ethical fuzzy subsets?
Here we obtain a widespread affirmative answer. Of
course, Example 3.3 defines a quasi-ethical fuzzy subset
of X¯ as argued above. But now we can do better than this
due to Basu and Mitra [7], who prove that there are WD,
AN social welfare functions on X= [0,1]N. Thus Theorem
3.5 below benefits from their result in order to state that the
answer to our question for the quasi-ethical restriction on
fuzzy subsets is affirmative for any X⊆ [0,1]N too.
Theorem 3.5 (Basu and Mitra [7]). There exist quasi-ethi-
cal fuzzy subsets of any X⊆ [0,1]N.
3.3.5 Are there basically ethical fuzzy subsets?
The answer to the question if there are basically ethical
fuzzy subsets of a suitable domain of utility streams is af-
firmative for any X ⊆ [0,1]N. We just need to check that
the minimax or Rawlsian fuzzy subset µR in Example 3.1
verifies the requested properties.
Although we have shown that there are quasi-ethical fuzzy
subsets of [0,1]N and also basically ethical fuzzy subsets of
[0,1]N, it is remarkable that quasi-ethical fuzzy subsets of
[0,1]N cannot be basically ethical. This is due to Lemma
3.1 in combination with Theorem 3.1.
3.4 OTHER VARIATIONS AND APPROACHES TO
THE CONCEPT
3.4.1 Equity in other forms
The ‘ethical’ concepts of fuzzy subsets of a (crisp) set
of infinite utility streams in Definition 3.1 do not exhaust
the possibilities in this regard. Other proposals can be
imported from the extensive literature on ranking infinite
utility streams. Suppose first that we are concerned with
the spirit of anonymity as in subsection 3.3. Then au-
thors like Kamaga and Kojima [9], Lauwers [10], Mitra
and Basu [11], or Zuber and Asheim [14] among others
have investigated the implications of stronger versions of
our Anonymity property. And in order to attempt a posi-
tive alternative to the impossibilities that have arisen, other
authors appeal to weakened versions of Anonymity. To
name but a few proposals, the aforementioned Crespo et
al. [8, Definition 4.1] or Asheim et al. [3]’s treatment of
relative anonymity, strong anonymity or fixed-step relative
anonymity. Sakai [12] provides a discussion of the contro-
versial problem of selecting appropriate anonymity axioms
in the context of aggregating infinite utility streams.
Besides these procedural properties there are other ap-
proaches to equity, and in relation with then one can define
more variations of the general concept of an ‘ethical’ fuzzy
subset of a domain of utility streams. The interested reader
is addressed to the analysis of consequentialist equity prop-
erties like the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle or Hammond
Equity in various forms. These are classical principles that
originate in the analysis of allocations to a finite number of
agents. As to egalitarian principles that are specifically de-
signed for the analysis of infinite societies or societies with
an infinite number of periods, the most relevant property
may be Hammond Equity for the Future. As in the case
of weakly ethical fuzzy subsets, its implications are very
different depending on the structure of the set of feasible
streams. This follows from a comparison between Alcan-
tud and García-Sanz [1] and Banerjee [5].
3.4.2 Respect for specific rules
Besides the generic forms of equity or efficiency mentioned
above, some authors have defended that certain incomplete
criteria for comparing streams on the basis of their accept-
ability must be respected. This alternative approach can be
adapted as the following explanatory example shows.
Definition 3.2. Let µ be a fuzzy subset of a domain of infi-
nite utility streams X⊆ [0,1]N such that the degree of mem-
bership of 1 ∈ X is 1, resp. of 0 ∈ X is 0. We say that µ
respects von Weizsäcker’s criterion if µ(x) > µ(y) when-
ever there is n0 ∈N such that ∑nk=1 xk > ∑nk=1 yk for every
n > n0.
Definition 3.2 asks that when a stream x overtakes another
stream y, the degree of membership of x must be higher
than the degree of membership of y. It is simple to check
that fuzzy subsets that verify anonymity and respect von
Weizsäcker’s criterion are ethical. Therefore in view of
Theorem 3.1:
Corollary 3.1. There do not exist anonymous fuzzy subsets
of X= {0,1}N that respect von Weizsäcker’s criterion.
We omit the details of further developments in this direc-
tion. Let us just point out that Asheim et al. [3] present a
new version of the overtaking criterion called generalized
time-invariant overtaking. Other interesting rules that are
arguably worth considering include various infinite exten-
sions of the leximin rule (cf., e.g., Asheim and Tungodden
[4], and Asheim et al. [3, Subsection 6.2]).
4 CONCLUSIONS
The concept of social welfare function (SWF) means an
evaluation of the objects under consideration, that verifies
certain properties making it efficient and egalitarian. We
have concentrated on SWFs on domains of infinite-horizon
utility distributions or streams. We have shown that the
identification of SWFs with adequate lists of properties can
be viewed as a problem in fuzzy set theory: the original
problem is equivalent to the identification of fuzzy subsets
of the set of feasible distributions with the corresponding
list of properties. Results from the standard literature on
SWFs can be imported to the new framework. Although
here we have focused on the case of infinite utility streams,
which is mathematically more challenging, the approach
can be employed to study allocations to a finitely-lived –or
finite– population instead.
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